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Through the spring of 2012, the Musée du Quai Branly in Paris hosted an 
exhibition entitled Human Zoos: The Invention of the Savage. It was a 
remarkable exploration of colonial constructions of racial difference through 
the phenomenon of the travelling human zoo. The various forms in which 
native ‘specimens’ were exhibited before voyeuristic Western audiences—
circus carnivals, theatre productions, fairs, freak shows, zoos, parades, mock 
ethnic villages—spanned a period of almost five centuries, reaching their 
apogee in the late nineteenth century, and enduring until Europe’s final 
colonial fair in 1958. With the colonial other—‘the strange, the savage and 
the monster’—routinely showcased in enclosures and scenes alongside 
animals, even the most cursory analysis reveals a blurring of the lines 
between human and beast, between colonized person and creature. 
Prevailing theories of racial superiority were embedded, and conquest 
legitimized, through the act of ‘exhibiting’ the inferior genus in the form of 
spectacle.1 Social, cultural and biological elements of the racial dynamic 
coalesced to narrate a story of the reduction of the colonized to a status less 
than human. This was the case in the representations of Aboriginal and 
American tribes, Asian and African savages;2 it transcended traditional racial 
indicators to extend also to Irish itinerants.3 
                                                
* EJ Phelan Fellow in International Law, National University of Ireland, Galway; Teaching 
Fellow in International Law, European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights & 
Democratisation, Venice. 
1 As the Quai Branly exhibition explains: “At a time when slavery gives place to imperialism, the 
world is divided between those who are exhibited and those who spectate.” 
2 In the late nineteenth century, a mentally disabled African-American, purportedly ‘caught in 
the Wilds of California’ was labelled ‘What is it?’ by the Barnum circus company and put on 
display under the following banner: “Is it an Animal? Is it Human? Is it an Extraordinary Freak 
of Nature? or, is it a Legitimate Member of Nature’s Works? Or is it the long sought for Link 
between Man and the Ourang-Outang?” In a similar vein, a performer named ‘Krao’ from Laos 
was advertised as “Darwin’s missing link.” In 1885, the Folies-Bergerès in Paris was the final 
venue for Le Spectacle d'Aborigènes d’Australie, a showcase of ‘Male and Female Australian 
Cannibals’ described as: “The first and only obtained colony of these strange, savage, disfigured 
and most brutal race ever lured from the remote interior wilds where they indulge in ceaseless 
bloody feuds and forays, to feast upon each other’s flesh.”  
3 Caricatures of the Irish as primates were common in nineteenth century English popular 
culture, with Punch magazine by no means alone in its depiction of the Irish as “the missing link 
between the gorilla and the Negro.” Punch XIV (1849), at 54; Punch XXIV (1851), at 26, 231. See 
further, for example, Richard Ned Lebow, White Britain and Black Ireland: The Influence of 
Stereotypes on Colonial Policy (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1976). The 
racial discourse in the Irish context serves to affirm a direct relationship between representation 
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The colonized Arab other was also very much present in this story, but 
perhaps cast in a less overtly subhuman role. The “Egyptian Caravan” that 
spent two months in Paris in 1891, for instance, played on orientalist 
depictions of an exotic Arabia,4 but arguably did not explicitly purport to 
dehumanize its troupe in the way that many other colonial performances 
did. While this is an opaque and unstated distinction, some visitors may 
have left the Quai Branly exposition with questions over the extent to which 
trajectories of racial discourse and constructed gradations of humanity 
varied across colonial time and space, and the reasons for such. 
Samera Esmeir’s Juridical Humanity,5 a compelling account of the 
relationship between modern law and the human in colonial Egypt, points to 
a similar ambivalence in colonizer-colonized dynamics. At the same time as 
the “Egyptian Caravan” was traversing the metropoles of Europe, Britain 
was immersed in a process of wholesale legal reform in Egypt. Following the 
Urabi revolution and British military conquest of the country in 1882, the 
colonial state embarked upon a juridical venture aimed at overhauling the 
legal system inherited from the pre-colonial Khedive. The mission was to 
emancipate Egyptians from the arbitrary and inhumane cruelties of Khedival 
rule, and to elevate them to a status of humanity previously lacking. Positive 
law was the force of modernity that would generate a rupture from the 
arbitrary violence of the pre-colonial past. The book tells a story of how 
modern law engendered a concept of what the author terms ‘juridical 
humanity’ that was rooted in sensibilities of humaneness and operated to 
inscribe the native Egyptian within the colonial rule of law. Through this 
particular narrative, Esmeir probes the more general relationship between 
law and the human with regard to history, nature, sovereignty and violence. 
Juridical Humanity is a pioneering piece of work. Prominent thinkers of 
Western modernity—Agamben, Arendt, Butler, Derrida, Foucault, Latour, 
and others—have of course extensively constructed and deconstructed the 
question of the ‘human’ and the dehumanizing designs of sovereign power 
(though rarely with direct reference to colonial paradigms).6 Scholars writing 
                                                
of the other as ‘biologically inferior’ and the maintenance of political domination. 
4 According to Pascal Blanchard, curator of the Human Zoos exhibition: “Men and women of the 
desert, camel drivers and camels (equipped with an amshqeb to carry the ‘women of the harem’), 
Swahili warriors, Berber craftsmen, Arab horsemen (with their long daggers), Bedouins in their 
tents, musicians and artists from British Sudan, Tunisian women dressed in festive garments 
and jewellery – nothing was lacking from this ‘Arab Caravan’.” The travelling ‘caravan’ was 
seen by 780,000 spectators before continuing on the road to Copenhagen, Milan, Munich and 
Vienna. Blanchard also notes that Egypt enjoyed a particular appeal in the imperial metropoles, 
with reconstructions of ‘a Cairo street’ commonplace at universal exhibitions. Pascal Blanchard, 
‘The Egyptian Caravan’ in Pascal Blanchard, Gilles Boëtsch & Nanette Jacomijn Snoep, Human 
Zoos: The Invention of the Savage (Paris: Actes Sud, 2012) at 106. For the research that spawned 
and informed the production of the Quai Branly exhibition, see Pascal Blanchard, Human Zoos: 
Science and Spectacle in the Age of Empire (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008). 
5 Samera Esmeir, Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2012) [Juridical Humanity]. 
6 Drawing on Giorgio Agamben’s notion of homo sacer, Judith Butler unpacks in more explicit 
terms the functioning of sovereign power “to derealize the humanity of subjects who might 
potentially belong to a community bound by commonly recognized laws.” Agamben’s 
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in the anti-colonial and postcolonial traditions, for their part, have 
trenchantly theorized the dehumanizing intentions of imperialism in the 
colony.7 Esmeir navigates all of this literature and more, but plots her own 
distinctive course through the relatively unchartered waters of legal 
narratives in British Egypt.  
The concept of juridical humanity both borrows from and departs from 
Hannah Arendt’s articulation of the ‘juridical person’.8 Whereas in Arendt’s 
account violence is a product of exclusion from the law (in the form of 
denationalization, or, in extremis, the camps’ location outside of the ‘normal’ 
legal system), Esmeir’s narration of Egypt’s colonial story reads inclusion in 
the law as a hegemonic technique that facilitates its own brand of violence. In 
a similar vein to Arendt’s portrait of exclusion, a common impulse of 
postcolonial scholarship is to frame the colonies as zones of lawlessness, 
defined by racialized power dynamics in which the native is expelled from 
the juridical order and excluded from humanity.9 Colonization, on this 
reading, dehumanizes through a process of exclusion from the law. The 
project of juridical humanity described by Esmeir, in contrast, connotes a 
type of inscription within the law that purports to enable a process of 
humanization—as seen through a colonial lens—based on a liberal idealizing 
of the ‘rule of law’. The effect of colonial law’s humane reforms is a process 
of rendering the natives—hitherto dehumanized by their own despotism—
human through the law.  
But to what end? While the book “does not presume to be an explicit 
critique of juridical humanity”,10 Esmeir’s analysis shows that this inclusivity 
is not driven by benevolent designs at emancipation and equality on the part 
of the colonial state. Rather, the cultivation of juridical humanity embodies a 
more nuanced technique of inscribing Egyptians within the law as “a 
                                                
paradigmatic state of exception, marked by conceptual binaries and zones of indistinction 
(inside/outside, norm/exception, public/private, zoē/bios), is defined as “an inclusive 
exclusion (which thus serves to include what is excluded)” that produces bare life through 
sovereign violence. This notion is applied by Michelle Farrell in her exploration of torture in 
Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians. The barbarian (the excluded) is civilized (included) through 
subjection to torture. The act of torture “signifies nothing other than the Empire’s ability to 
render life bare and to inscribe the meaning of humanity upon the excluded body.” See Judith 
Butler, Precarious Life (London: Verso, 2004) at 68; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power 
and Bare Life (1995), translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998) at 21; Michelle Farrell, On Torture (Doctoral Thesis, National University of Ireland, 
Galway, 2011) [unpublished] at 284, forthcoming as The Prohibition of Torture in Exceptional 
Circumstances (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
7 Frantz Fanon, however, acknowledges the attempts of colonial discourse to confiscate the 
humanity of the native but refuses to accept that such rhetoric is performative or that the 
colonial subject can be stripped of its agency (the native ‘knows that he is not an animal … he is 
treated as an inferior but is not convinced of his inferiority’). That is, humanity is not something 
that can be juridically given or taken away. See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (1961) 
(New York: Grove Press, 1963). In this regard, Esmeir takes a different tack, but acknowledges 
her indebtedness to Fanon’s work on the human and colonialism nonetheless. 
8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Meridian, 1958) at 447-55. 
9 See Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism (1955) (London: Monthly Press, 1972); Achille 
Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).  
10 Juridical Humanity, supra note 5 at 286. 
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technology of colonial rule and a modern relationship of bondage.”11 Esmeir 
chronicles the humanizing reforms that included the attempted elimination 
of torture, the abolition of the use of the curbash (whip), as well as decrees for 
more humane treatment of criminals, prisoners and animals.  Here, she says, 
“the project of juridical humanity put pain and suffering to use.”12 While 
colonial law’s humanitarian intervention was effected through the reduction 
of suffering, Egypt was the subject of parallel thought processes of 
modernity that produced a domain of lawful, utilitarian, humane violence: 
“Humanity is truly universalized when, in the colonies, pain is properly 
measured, administered, and instrumentalised. Only pain that serves an end 
is admitted. Useless, non-instrumental pain is rejected.”13  
Under the imperial gaze, therefore, the inhumanity of pre-colonial 
violence lies not in the violence itself, but in its alleged arbitrariness. Juridical 
humanity, in Esmeir’s reckoning, did not seek to prevent pain and suffering 
per se, but to eliminate the prescription of disproportionate or unproductive 
pain. Such instrumental suffering would often (though not always) assume 
the form of less overt modes of wounding than torture and whipping. Here, 
Esmeir’s analysis of British reforms in Egypt takes its cue from Michel 
Foucault’s theorization of certain features of liberal modernity—the abolition 
of public torture, criminal justice reforms, the architecture of the 
panopticon—as new technologies of (bio)power directed more at the mind 
than the body. Like Foucault, Esmeir is unconvinced and unsettled by law’s 
instrumental means-end logic, and the distinction between arbitrary cruelty 
and calculated productive humane violence. The impossibility of that 
distinction, in her final analysis, “reveals all of the law’s violence as 
arbitrary” and signals a “collapse of ends into means.”14 Esmeir’s extensive 
reading of the British-Egyptian colonial archive does convincingly 
demonstrate the thrust of juridical humanity as an attempt to frame the 
liberalism of colonial governance in juxtaposition to the violence of pre-
colonial despotism. The form that this took—British officials ordering the 
cessation of torture and insisting on humane treatment of prisoners—did 
surpass more vacuous ‘rule of law’ platitudes propounded elsewhere, and 
subverted the narrative of empire as dehumanizing. As noted, Esmeir 
counters persuasively that the pre-colonial/colonial distinction is not one 
that holds neatly. Her account does not offer clarification, however, as to the 
rationale underlying the pretensions and performance of humane reforms in 
the Egyptian case, while in colonies elsewhere—Kenya, for instance—brutal 
violence against natives in detention camps would continue to be an 
institutionally (if not openly) prescribed practice much later into the imperial 
story.15 Did colonial policy in Egypt differ on account of its arguably distinct 
                                                
11 Ibid at 285. 
12 Ibid at 111. 
13 Ibid at 142. 
14 Ibid at 288-89. 
15 See Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (London: 
Pimlico, 2005); David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of 
Empire, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005); Mutua and others v The Foreign and 
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status—protectorate as opposed to colony; occupied rather than colonized? 
Or did perceptions of a richer history of civilization and a different racial 
dynamic come into play? Esmeir describes race as “significant to the colonial 
encounter” in Egypt. She opts not to elaborate on what she understands as 
the content of that significance, but implies contours in Egypt somewhat 
distinct from the standard civilized/savage binaries that define much of 
European imperialism’s relationship with the colony. Here, like the visitor to 
the Quai Branly exhibition, the reader may be left wanting further 
explanation. 
The text, however, consciously directs its focus elsewhere and emerges 
as an exceptional piece of scholarship from the points of view of both legal 
history and legal theory. It was, the author informs us, a decade in the 
making, and the magnitude of her undertaking is laid bare by the depth of 
historical research and richness of analysis permeating the manuscript. 
Although not situated explicitly or exclusively on the terrain of international 
law, the subject matter of Juridical Humanity resonates with third world 
approaches to international law (TWAIL) scholarship and may have 
benefited from further engagement with that field. While touching upon one 
particular aspect of Antony Anghie’s work on the temporalities of legal 
positivism and coloniality,16 Esmeir does not delve any further into the 
expanding body of TWAIL literature.17 Readers familiar with that literature 
will ponder the extent to which Esmeir sees her conception of juridical 
humanity mirroring Anghie’s own work on Vitoria and Spanish colonization 
of the Americas in the sixteenth century. In contrast to other 
contemporaneous European jurists who “characterised the Indians as 
heathens, and animals”, Vitoria recognized their humanity. This “recognition 
of the humanity of the Indians has ambiguous consequences because it 
serves in effect to bind them to a natural law which, despite its claims to 
universality, appears derived from an idealised European view of the 
world.”18 Falling short of the European standard of civilization required to 
administer a legitimate state, the ‘Indians’ would violate this law by virtue of 
their very existence, identity and cultural practices. On the basis of such 
violation, Spanish travel, trade, conquest and sovereignty is justified. Thus, 
perhaps akin to Britain’s legal reforms in Egypt, Vitoria’s humanizing legal 
doctrine is one that inscribes to deprive, that includes to exclude. 
Esmeir’s historical deconstruction of law as a surface of contestation in a 
transformed political environment certainly chimes with contemporary 
debates around the fluid, and severely strained, revolutionary process in 
                                                
Commonwealth Office, [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB).  
16 Juridical Humanity, supra note 5 at 34-35. 
17 In addition to Anghie, the work on colonialism and international legal doctrine of scholars 
such as R.P. Anand, C.H. Alexandrowicz, Bhupinder Chimni, James Gathii and Makau Mutua 
carries resonance with Esmeir’s field of inquiry. In the specific context of modern Egyptian legal 
history, Amr Shalakany’s work bears noting here. 
18 Antony Anghie, “The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities” 
(2006) 27:5 Third World Q 739 at 743. See also Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the 
Making of International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 13-31. 
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Egypt. Legal reform has arisen as central to that process, with post-Mubarak 
political forces having chosen “law as the privileged form through which to 
bargain with each other”; no sooner had the public space opened up for the 
political to re-emerge as an autonomous sphere “than that sphere became 
annexed by the legal.”19 While Esmeir acknowledges law’s counter-
revolutionary impulses in the form of “legal technology that functions to 
prevent revolution against the law and to assert state power”,20 her 
characterization of juridical humanity performing itself while at the same 
time producing its own critique points to law’s repression/resistance double 
move: “[t]his is why modern law has become such a powerful technology of 
government and a tool of emancipatory struggles.”21 The structural 
contradictions within the law are thus revealed. The final chapter of Juridical 
Humanity elucidates the ‘exceptional legalities’—martial law, military 
tribunals, special commissions—of British rule that produced a hybrid 
colonial liberal legal regime, split between its ideals of humanity and its 
factual violence. The Mubarak regime’s thirty years of authoritarian rule 
were grounded in a state of emergency paradigm descended from Britain’s 
legal ordering of modern Egypt. Where juridical humanity is a process that 
chains the human to the law and to the state, it takes, Esmeir tells us, “a 
particular kind of rebellion, not just any rebellion, to break these chains.”22 
The Tahrir intifada shook the post-colonial state out of a stupor that was 
rooted in a prosaic and “endless”23 emergency. Itself a central target of the 
protestors’ demands, the state of emergency was extended by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces in 2011, ended by Parliament in 2012, and 
partly reinstated by President Morsi in January 2013. Legal contestations will 
continue. It remains to be seen whether Egypt’s revolutionary protest 
movements will ultimately be remembered as (the beginnings of) what 
Walter Benjamin envisaged as a “real state of emergency” aimed at decisive 
rupture from permanent normalized emergency, rather than its mere 
regulation and containment.24 For this, clearly, has been the aim; to borrow 
Esmeir’s language, the protests “affirm a subject who rejects the system of 
bondage with the state and the law.”25 They seek, that is, to reclaim 
humanity from juridicality. 
 
 
                                                
19 Lama Abu Odeh, “Of Law and the Revolution” Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other 
Works (2012), Paper 1047, online: <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1047>. 
20 Juridical Humanity, supra note 5 at 3. 
21 Ibid at 289 [emphasis added]. 
22 Ibid at 11. 
23 Sadiq Reza, “Endless Emergency: The Case of Egypt” (2007) 10:4 New Crim L Rev 532 at 532-
53. 
24 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” in Howard Eiland & Michael W Jennings, 
Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol 4: 1938–1940 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2003) at 389, 392. See also John Reynolds, “The Political Economy of States of Emergency” (2012) 
14:1 Or Rev Int’l L 85 at 128-30.  
25 Juridical Humanity, supra note 9 at 291. 
